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SUMNER CANARY LECTURE
UNDER SHELTER OF
CONFIDENTIALITY
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.'
The law confers on lawyers two strong legal powers that endow
us with unique authority in our constitutional system. One of these
powers is the right to maintain litigation on behalf of clients against
others. The other is that of maintaining secrets imparted by clients in
the course of seeking legal advice or assistance. Neither of these
powers is unqualified. The power to prosecute or defend litigation is
qualified by the duty to refrain from frivolous litigation, a duty me-
morialized in the rules of ethics and in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.2 The power to maintain client secrets is also
1 This article is adapted from a lecture delivered by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law as part of the 1999 Sumner Canary Memorial Lec-
ture Series.
t Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Director Emeritus, American
Law Institute.
2 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that:
[b]y presenting to the court... a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attor-
ney.., is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and be-
lief[:]
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by exist-
ing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if spe-
cifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable op-
portunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
Model Rule 3.1 provides that:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a
good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A
lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding
that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to
require that every element of the case be established.
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qualified. One qualification is that the client may waive the privi-
lege.3 Another is that the privilee does not protect communications
in furtherance of crime or fraud. Nevertheless, these qualifications
are relatively narrow in scope and rarely have application when a
lawyer is engaged in a good faith effort to carry out his professional
responsibilities. Put differently, a lawyer seriously endeavoring to
represent a client can be confident that the law, ordinarily, will pro-
vide her with legal immunity for the aggression involved in conduct-
ing litigation and the dissimulation involved in withholding confiden-
tial client information.
I use the terms "aggression" and "dissimulation" advisedly.
Concerning aggression in litigation, those of us within the Bar can too
easily forget the true nature of litigation. From the viewpoint of the
legal system, litigation is a search for justice; but from the viewpoint
of the litigants it is a combination of unfriendly aggression and exas-
perating frustration, and usually expensive as well. Yet lawyers are
permitted by law to orchestrate these psychological brutalities. Trial
lawyers refer, usually with some pride, to their work as being "in the
pit"--meaning, I suppose, a bear pit or perhaps a snake pit.
I. THE POWER OF MAINTAINING CLIENT SECRETS
Lawyers are perhaps even less sensitive to the social and moral
significance of our power and duty to maintain client confidences. In
this analysis I shall refer to the concept of client confidentiality and
MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 3.1 (1998). Rule 3.1 corresponds in its
essentials to the counterpart in the Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102, which
provides:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action
on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law,
except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing la*.
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is ob-
vious that the evidence is false.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1981).
Other limitations are imposed by statute in some jurisdictions. See, e.g, 28 U.S.C. §
1927 (1994) (empowering a court to impose sanctions on one who multiplies litigation vexa-
tiously).
3 See CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (holding that a trustee of a corporation in
bankruptcy may waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNiNG LAWYERS § 128 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[The
attorney-client privilege is not to be used as a cloak for illegal or fraudulent behavior.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 3, § 132 (stating the
exception for client crime or fraud).
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attorney-client privilege more or less interchangeably, even though
there are distinct differences between these concepts. The rule of cli-
ent confidentiality is a duty of a lawyer to keep confidential all matter
relating to a client, including information acquired from third-party
sources.5 The rule of attorney-client privilege is a right of the client
to prohibit inquiry in a legal proceeding into a subset of those confi-
dences, that is, the client's communications to the lawyer However,
the two concepts are linked in policy and in practical consequences.
The policies allowing a client to keep his legal business and his legal
troubles to himself are based on the notion that without confidential-
ity, effective representation is impossible. The practical consequence
is that the attorney-client privilege becomes the legal basis for pre-
venting third parties from inquiring into matters that the lawyer is
obliged to keep secret.
There was a time when the attorney-client privilege had limited
scope and when the duty of confidentiality was not separately articu-
lated. Until the 17th century, a defendant in a criminal case was not
accorded a right to counsel, let alone a right to confer confidentially
with a lawyer.7 It was only in the 18th century that assistance of
counsel became common in civil litigation! According to the de-
cided cases the issue of client confidences was not often pressed.
Probably it was simply assumed that a client's consultation with a
lawyer should not be inquired into. At all events, it was not until the
19th century that the attorney-client privilege became firmly estab-
lished in the common law rules of evidence.
Even then, however, there was doubt whether the privilege was
available not only to individuals, but also to organizations such as a
corporation. Indeed, uncertainty as to whether the privilege could be
claimed by corporations persisted until the 1960s, when a Federal
District Judge shocked the legal world by holding the privilege un-
availing to corporations, only to be summarily reversed by the 7th
Circuit Court of Appeals. 9 The leading modem case, Upjohn Co. v.
5 See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 cmt. (1998) (stating that an
attorney may not reveal information regarding the representation of a client); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAvYERS, supra note 3, § 111 cmt. 6 (stating that confiden-
tial client information includes information gathered from third- party sources); id. § 112 (stat-
ing that a lawyer may not disclose confidential client information).
6 See, e.g., JOHN W. STRONG sr AL., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, §§ 87-97 (4th ed.
1992) (providing background on attorney-client privilege).
7 See generally, John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263, 307-14 (1978) (discussing the evolution of the rights of criminal defendants to confer
with counsel before the more modem protections of the 5th Amendment and other mechanisms
came into being).
8 See id. (noting that the right to counsel was formally guaranteed only in the Prisoner's
Counsel Act of 1836).
9 See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 207 F.Supp. 771 (N.D. 111. 1962), rev'd,
320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 429 (1963) (holding that the attorney-client
privilege does extend to corporate entities).
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United States,10 established that corporations are entitled to client se-
crecy like individuals, but the Court did so by presupposition rather
than direct affirmation. The extension of the attorney-client privilege
to corporations and other organizations was not compelled by the
logic of the privilege. A comparable privilege-that against self-
incrimination-is not extended to corporations, 1 and a corporation
obviously cannot enjoy the other "classic" privileges: priest-penitent,
doctor-patient, and spousal communication.' 2  Corporate enjoyment
of the privilege is of great practical importance, however, particularly
in civil matters-that is, apart from representations of individuals ac-
cused of crime.
In statistical terms, the largest fraction of legal services in this
country is provided to corporations and other organizations. 13 Hence,
it is in the corporate setting that the protection of confidentiality has
most frequent operation. More fundamentally, in today's complex
world, most legal deliberations are conducted by organizations on
either one side or both sides of a transaction. It may be an historical
coincidence, but perhaps not, that the confirmation of the attorney-
client privilege in favor of corporations emerged in the same present
era in which the scope of discovery in civil cases was so broadly ex-
tended under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Sixty years ago,
on the eve of adoption of the Federal Rules, a corporation may have
been insecure as to whether it could claim attorney-client privilege for
its documents, but its documents were subject to discovery only if
specifically identified and indicated to be relevant. 4  By the 1980s,
the counterpoise had been reversed: Discovery of documents was
virtually unconstrained except by the rules of privilege, but the pro-
tections of attorney-client privilege and the related work product im-
munity doctrine had been accorded to corporations.
At all events, I suggest that the shelter of confidentiality ac-
corded to legal consultations is of greatest practical significance in
10 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
" See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988) (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43 (1906), for the proposition that the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does
not extend to corporations).
12 See STRONG ET AL., supra note 6, §§ 78-86, 98-105, 76.2 (describing the privileges for
marital communications, communications in the physician-patient relationship and communica-
tions between clergyman and penitents).
13 See Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71
DENY. U. L. REv. 77, 88 n.47 (1993) (citing a 1992 National Association of Manufacturers'
estimate that business expenditures on legal services in 1992 were $110 billion out of a total of
$163.4 billion).
14 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1665
(1998) (detailing early interpretation of the scope of document discovery); see also Stephen N.
Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discov-
ery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REv. 691, 700 (1998) (citing then-existing rules requiring that documents
discovered contain "evidence material to the cause of action" and that an adverse party admit
possession of a document to be discovered).
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defense of criminal matters and in the deliberations of corporations
and other organizations about their legal positions and strategies.
II. "EXTERNAL" AND "INTERNAL" RULES REGARDING CLIENT
CONFIDENTIALITY
The rules qualifying the principle of confidentiality are of two
general kinds. The lawyer with whom the client is engaged adminis-
ters one set of qualifications. I shall call these "internal" qualifica-
tions, meaning that these rules operate internally in the lawyer-client
relationship. These matters are the principal focus of this analysis
and are addressed presently. The other qualifications are typically
invoked by a party opposing the client and are applied by the courts to
deny or restrict protection of the privilege. These "external" rules
include the following:
The crime/fraud exception, which denies protection to com-
munications made in furtherance of crime or fraud. The con-
cept is that the right of privacy recognized in the privilege
should not shelter the plotting of criminal and fraudulent
harms against others.
15
The "defense of legal advice" exception, which denies pro-
tection to confidentiality where legal advice is asserted as ex-
cuse or justification for conduct that would otherwise be
criminal or tortious. The concept is that when the "alibi" of
legal advice is offered, the tribunal is entitled to be fully in-
formed as to what the advice in fact was all about.
16
The "disclosure" exception, which denies protection where
the client has previously disclosed the protected communica-
tion.1
7
The "lawyer self defense" exception, which permits the law-
yer to reveal confidences to the extent necessary to defend
against charges arising out of the representation, including
charges made by the client.
18
Administration of the exceptions is complicated by a chicken-
and-egg dilemma: How to avoid disclosure of the communication in
determining whether or not the communication is open to disclo-
15 See REsTATEMENT (TIiRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 3, § 132
(describing the exception for crime or fraud).
16 See id. § 130 (describing waiver by putting assistance or communication in issue).
17 See Ud § 129 (describing waiver by subsequent disclosure).
1S See d. § 133 (stating exceptions for lawyer self-protection).
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sure. 19 Subject to the difficulties posed by this dilemma, the "exter-
nal" limitations on the attorney-client privilege are administered
through the procedure that is employed in the law generally, that is,
through proof of objective evidence, including circumstantial evi-
dence, assessed by a disinterested judge after a bilateral adversarial
proceeding. Proceedings challenging the privilege necessarily in-
volve implicit or explicit charges of professional misconduct by the
lawyer and typically are correspondingly embittered. The admini-
stration of the "internal" rules governing confidential communications
is quite different. Indeed, it is usually invisible and inaudible.
III. RULE OF CONFIDENTIALITY ADMINISTERED BY "INTERNAL"
PROCEDURE
The rules administered by "internal" procedure are those inter-
preted and applied by the lawyer whose conduct is governed by those
rules. Their observance thus is primarily and ordinarily a matter of
the lawyer's conscience. In terms of the procedure for their obser-
vance, these rules therefore operate as moral norms rather than legal
rules.20 In one sense, of course, all the rules regulating lawyers are in
the first instance self-administered, in that the lawyer is obliged to
regulate her conduct according to these norms and can claim them as
justification if that conduct is later called into question. However, in
the case of the rules whose operation is internal to a client-lawyer re-
lationship, the lawyer's compliance ordinarily remains invisible and
inaudible to anyone except the client. The focus here is on those
rules.
The prevailing codification of the rules of professional ethics is
the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct.21 An important internal regulation is that in Rule 1.1, dealing
with competency. Rule 1.1 provides that "A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client."22  A lawyer addresses the
'9 See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556 (1989) (holding that the applicability of
the crime-fraud statute may be resolved by an in camera inspection of the allegedly privileged
material). In the less sensitive context of disqualification, the dilemma is handled by the rule
that the claimant need only show that the present matter is "substantially related" to that in
which the confidential information was presumably imparted. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 3, § 135 (invoking the attorney-client privilege and
its exceptions).
20 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals and Ethics, 19 S. ILL. U. LJ. 447,458 (1995)
(explaining the distinction and overlap between the law, morals and ethics).
21 See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDtUCr (1998). The ABA adopted the Rules
of Professional Conduct in 1983. Ohio and several other states, notably California, lilinois, and
New York, have not adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct, although they have drawn on
various provisions. These and other states adhere to rules more or less resembling the ABA's
previous codification, the Code of Professional Responsibility. For purposes of the present
analysis, however, the differences between the Rules and the Code are of little significance.
22 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 (1998).
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problem of his competence only when a client has come into view. A
lawyer obviously has a subjective viewpoint and a conflict of interest
in assessing his own competence, and hence whether to undertake a
new matter.2
An important cluster of internal regulations is in Rule 1.2. Rule
1.2(a) requires the lawyer to defer to the client concerning "the ob-
jectives" of the representation and to consult with the client concern-
ing "the means." The distinction between "objectives" and "means" is
clear at either end of a spectrum but notoriously and unavoidably am-
biguous in the middle range.24 However, Rule 1.2(a) elaborates cer-
tain particulars, requiring a lawyer to defer to the client in "whether to
accept an offer of settlement[.]" 25 Similarly, in a criminal case, the
rule applies to the decision whether to plead guilty or nolo conten-
dere, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to take the stand (and
thus waive the privilege against self-incrimination).
Rule 1.2(c) authorizes a lawyer to "limit the objectives" of a rep-
resentation. This rule is a correlative of the principle that a client-
lawyer relationship is one of contract, wherein the contract must have
some express or implied scope. A familiar example of the problem of
scope is whether counsel engaged to try a case also has responsibility
for taking an appeal.2 6 The question of scope ordinarily is worked
out, for better or worse, under the shelter of confidentiality, so that an
opposing party and the courts typically are unaware of the issue un-
less the client later objects. 27
2 The disciplinary standard of competence is notoriously modest. See Edmund B. Spaeth,
Jr., To What Extent Can A Disciplinary Code Assure the Competence of Lawyers, 61 TEMP. L.
REV. 1211 (1988) (stating that the principal external review of competence is the action for legal
malpractice). See generally RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
(4th ed. 1996).
24 See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client
Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation and
Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 819, 825-30 (1990) (noting that in
many cases it is difficult to distinguish between means and ends, and that clients may have
multiple ends and hence should be involved in choices of means which impact each of those
ends differently); Judith L Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1049, 1061 (1984) (noting that the dis-
tinction between means and objectives is not a "bright line" and that "sometimes a clear distinc-
tion is impossible"); David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV.
454, 459 n.9 (1981) (arguing that "[t]actical decisions in a valid legal order are never merely
decisions about means [for example, a defendant may] want to win acquittal by asserting a cer-
tain right... or he may wish to obtain a settlement without using a certain tactic, because he
disapproves of the tactie").
9 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1998).
26 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note
3, § 28 (stating that a lawyer's duties to client in general); id, cmt. f ("Contracts generally create
or define the duties the lawyer owes the client."). See, e.g., Saferstein v. Paul, 1997 WL 102521,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (dismissing a client's malpractice claim based on attorney's refusal to file
n apr7 ) attorney is presumed to have the authority to conclude settlement negotiations on
behalf of a party, and an agreement will only be set aside where there is affirmative proof that
19991
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Rule 1.2(d) reiterates the common law rule that a lawyer may not
"counsel or assist" a client in crime or fraud. However, the rule goes
on to allow a lawyer to "discuss the legal consequences of any pro-
posed course of conduct... .,28 Here there is another spectrum along
which there is a clearly prohibited zone at one end ("Let me tell you
how to evade the income tax law. . . .") but also unavoidable inde-
terminacy. 29 Perhaps the most vivid illustration of that indeterminacy
is the line delivered by Jimmy Stewart as the lawyer in Anatomy of a
Murder, where he exits the interview with the client saying: "Now,
lieutenant, how crazy were you?"30 Rule 1.2(e) states a corollary as
follows: "When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not
permitted by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the law-
yer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on
the lawyer's conduct."
31
Rule 1.5 governs fee arrangements with clients, an essential as-
pect of a legal representation, particularly from the client's viewpoint.
For new representations, where the client has not been previously rep-
resented by the lawyer, Rule 1.5 requires that the terms of the fee be
"communicated" at the beginning of the engagement, "preferably in
no such authority existed. See Surety Ins. Co. v. Williams, 729 F.2d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 1984)
(ruling that the Williams' must prove through affirmative evidence that their attorney acted
without actual, implied, or apparent authority); see also Capital Dredge & Dock Corp. v. De-
troit, 800 F.2d 525, 530 (6th Cir. 1986) (litigating lawyer has apparent authority to settle on
behalf of her clients); International Telemeter Corp. v. Teleprompter Corp., 592 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.
1979) (finding that a party's lawyer had apparent authority to conclude settlement negotiations).
But see Fennell v. TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that an attorney had no
apparent authority to settle where his client had never manifested such authority to the opposing
party's lawyer).
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.2(d) (1998). Rule 1.2(d) continues
that a lawyer may "counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the valid-
ity, scope, meaning or application of the law." Id. This proviso recognizes the pervasive signifi-
cance of judicial review in the American form of government, allowing the lawyer to invoke the
powers of the courts to construe legislation and administrative action and, when appropriate, to
invalidate it on constitutional grounds.
29 Outside of fiction there is only rare documentation of this kind of interview, because
neither lawyer nor client ordinarily has incentive to disclose such an exchange. There have been
some disciplinary and malpractice cases involving a complaint that the lawyer advised the client
to lie. See In re Oberhellman, 873 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1994) (disciplining an attorney for advising
his client to testify falsely concerning her residence); In re Edson, 530 A.2d 1246 (N.J. 1987)
(sanctioning a lawyer who counseled client to fabricate a material fact). A sense of what is
involved, however, can be inferred from study of interaction between client and counsel in
criminal cases. Experienced counsel do not want to know from the client whether he is "really
guilty." See KENNErH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS
AT WORK (1985); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (finding that an attorney's refusal to
cooperate with defendant in presenting perjured testimony did not violate the Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel).
30 ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia 1959).
31 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5 (1998). It may be noted that this rule
does not require the lawyer to be a "preacher" regarding the client's conduct. Rather, the re-
quirement concerns informing the client as to what actions the lawyer cannot take. Obviously,
in most situations the latter admonition has necessary and significant implications as to the
client's legal obligations.
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writing."32 The common law rules governing this threshold phase of
a client-lawyer relationship are somewhat peculiar. Until the contract
is formed, the common law treats prospective client and lawyer as
dealing at arms' length, so that the client can agree to virtually an3
arrangement that is not illegal, fraudulent, or grossly unreasonable. 3
On the other hand, after the contract is formed the lawyer owes the
client a fiduciary duty of the highest degree.34 The rule could be, but
is not, that a fiduciary duty to a prospective client extends to the fee
negotiations. A recurrent issue has been contingent fee agreements in
matters in which actual contingency of recovery is virtually nonexist-
ent-the fee to be charged for "slam dunk" claims. The ABA Stand-
ing Committee on Ethics has wrestled with this issue but produced
only equivocal guidance.35 In any event, unless a dispute later erupts
between lawyer and client, the bargaining process concerning the fee
remains secret.
Rule 1.6, dealing with confidentiality, has important qualifica-
tions concerning crime, fraud, and lawyer self-defense. 36  However,
32 Id. Model Rule 1.5(b) states that "[w]hen the lawyer has not regularly represented the
client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing,
before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.5(b) (1998). Rule 1.5(c) requires contingent fee agreements to
be in writing. Id. Rule 1.5(c). A few states now require all or most fee agreement to be in writ-
ing. See CAL. CODE ANN. BUS. PROFESSIONS § 6147 (West 1990); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
20.340(a) (Supp. 1998).
33 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 3, § 46.
On the standard of unconscionability that may void a fee contract, see Brobeck v. Telex Corp.,
602 F.2d 866, 875 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a contract requiring a retainer fee of $25,000 to
be paid even if the motion for certiorari was denied was not unconscionable); McKenzie
Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 758 F.2d 97, 100 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that an "unreasonable" stan-
dard rather than the clearly excessive standard should be used in determining the reasonableness
of a contingent fee).
3 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 3, § 28.
The classic statement of fiduciary duty is that by Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249
N.Y. 458, 464 (1928) (holding that "[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior").
35 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389 (1994)
(opining that even when the opposing party's liability is clear, a contingent fee does not violate
ethical standards "as long as the fee is appropriate and reasonable and the client has been fully
informed of the availability of alternative billing arrangements"); Lester Brickman, ABA Regu-
lation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 271 (1996)
(arguing that the ABA disingenuously ducked the ethical issues posed by contingent fees in
cases where recovery is likely, and that charging contingent fees in such cases "violates fiduci-
ary law"); Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A Proposal For Con-
tingeney Fee Reform, 44 EMORY LJ. 173, 174 n.4 (1995) (criticizing the ABA opinion's "sin-
gular focus on risks to attorneys").
36 Model Rule 1.6 states:
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client.., except
... to the extent the lawyer believes reasonably necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to re-
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these essentially mirror the qualifications concerning the attorney-
client privilege previously mentioned.37  Perhaps it need only be
noted that the lawyer himself administers the rule of confidentiality,
whereas the attorney-client privilege is a forensic rule administered
by the courts.
The rules concerning conflict of interest, Rules 1.7-1.11, gener-
ally permit consent by the client to regularize a representation that
would otherwise be impressible on account of conflict of interest.
Effective client consent, however, must be predicated on the client
being "adequately informed"--a concept conventionally shorted into
the formula of "informed consent. '38 The provision of information,
discussion of the implications and resolution of a lawyer's request for
such consent occurs in confidence and is protected by the attorney-
client privilege. Accordingly, the content of those communications is
ordinarily shielded from external scrutiny and, generally speaking,
properly so.
Particularly sensitive is the problem of client consent in settle-
ment of claims where more than one client is represented by the same
lawyer. This situation is a variation of a "consentable conflict," i.e., a
representation involving conflict of interest that is permissible only on
the basis of informed consent. However, the problem is a common
one and is specifically addressed in Rule 1.8(g), which provides:
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not par-
ticipate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims for
or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated
agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each
client consents after consultation, including disclosure of the
spond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998).
Comment 16 to Rule 1.6 in effect allows a lawyer to disclose client fraud. See Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a Professional Norm, 33
EMORY L.J. 271 (1984) (arguing that lawyers must be allowed a "self-defense' exception to the
confidentiality rule).
37 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 3, § 133.
38 For discussions of "adequacy," see Fred. C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest,
108 YALE L.J. 407 (1998); Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doc-
trine, 5 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 823 (1992); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts ofInterest in the Simulta-
neous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and
Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1982). For a formulation of the rule as to adequacy, see
RESTATEMENT (HRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 3, § 202 (stating the
California rule for "Client Consent to a Conflict of Interest"). In California, the consent must be
in writing. See CALFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT RuLE 3-310 (stating that dis-
closure and consent must be in writing).
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existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved of the
participation of each person in the settlement.
39
The problem of settlement of claims of clients in multiple repre-
sentation engaged the attention of the Supreme Court in the attempted
"global settlements" in some of the asbestos litigation.4° Although
the scale of the multiple representation obviously is much greater in
these and other class action cases, analytically the problem is similar
to that in any multiple representation.
In all of these situations, particularly in fee negotiation and a
"consentable conflict," the shelter of confidentiality poses the un-
avoidable danger that clients may be exploited by lawyers, because a
lawyer necessarily has personal incentive in the transaction. Yet there
is no way of eliminating the danger of exploitation without breaching
the confidential relationship. More fundamentally, the concept of
consentable conflicts is predicated on an assumption that clients are
generally to be considered, in the colloquial phrase, "consenting
adults." All contractual relationships are based on such a predicate.
Situations where the client cannot confidently be considered sui juris
are unavoidably difficult for the law to deal with-clients who are
children, for example, in juvenile court proceedings, or mentally in-
capacitated or suffering the encroachments of aging. There is a rule
on the subject, Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules, but it is designedly and
unavoidably ambiguous. 41 Except at ends of the spectrum, the prob-
lem of a client's mental competence is one of more or less.
Another "internal" provision is Rule 1.16, which governs with-
drawal, permissive and mandatory. A normal "withdrawal" occurs at
completion of an engagement. Otherwise, a withdrawal indicates
39 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8 (1998); see also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-106 (1981) (containing substantially similar language).
40 See Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (upholding an appeals court ruling
that certification as a class was inappropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23); In re Asbestos Litiga-
tion, 134 F.3d 668, 670 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998) (approving class
action settlements in asbestos-related claims).
41 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.14 (1998) (stating:
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection
with the representation is impaired, whether because of minority, mental disability
or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a
normal client-lawyer relationship with the client
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action
with respect to a client only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client can-
not adequately act in the client's own interest.)
Id.; see also Jan Ellen Rein, Client's Destructive and Socially Harmfid Choices -- What's an
Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1101
(1994) (questioning when it is appropriate to regulate or override the decisions made by a cli-
ent); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the
Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 515, 516 (1987) (discussing the role of an
attorney when representing an impaired client). The critics are long on disparagement of the
rule but short on proposals for making it more concrete.
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some kind of breakdown in the client-lawyer relationship, typically a
client's failure to pay accrued fees or a serious disagreement between
client and lawyer about strategy in the engagement, notably differ-
ences over settlement. The conversations between client and lawyer
over these issues can be very acrimonious, but they usually are pro-
tected from external inquiry unless the client wishes to challenge the
withdrawal. Even when withdrawal becomes necessary or permissi-
ble, however, the lawyer is obliged to make no disclosure broader
than reasonably necessary for extrication. 42
This catalogue of "internal" rules does not exhaust the situations
in which lawyers' discussions with clients are shrouded in secrecy.
Another salient and much debated situation is where the lawyer sur-
mises that a client wants to give knowingly false testimony.43 A less
discussed but equally important situation concerns the appropriate
protocol for a corporate lawyer dealing with corporate officials en-
gaged in conduct legally deleterious to the corporation.44 However,
the foregoing review is more than sufficient to frame the basic ethical
problem confronting a lawyer in these situations: what should the
lawyer say, in words or by body language and other means, to a client
whose proposed course of action is at variance with what the lawyer
considers appropriate?
The Rules do not say much about this. As noted above, Rule
1.2(d) requires a lawyer to wave off a client who wants to conscript
the lawyer into an illegal or fraudulent transaction. A lawyer's self-
interest strongly supports this duty, because a lawyer who assists in
such a transaction becomes complicit in civil liability and perhaps
42 The formula in the RESTATEMENT (TIIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs is:
"[u]pon termination of a representation, a lawyer shall take reasonable steps to protect a client's
interests .... A lawyer shall: (a) Follow requirements stated in other provisions of this Re-
statement concerning former clients such as those dealing with client confidences .... "
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 3, § 45. Cf MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr RULE 1.16, cmt. 3 (1998) (stating procedure for withdrawal
when a lawyer has been appointed by court).
43 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1998); MONROE H.
FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 109-41 (1990) (analyzing whether it is ever
proper for a lawyer to present testimony the lawyer knows is perjurious); Philip J. Grib, A Law-
yer's Ethically Justified "Cooperation" in Client Perjury, 18 J. Legal Prof. 145 (1993) (dis-
cussing various positions on the ethical responsibilities in the perjurious client context); Jay
Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: The Case Against the Client Perjury
Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339, 343-352 (1994) (discussing the history and scope of the client
perjury rules); see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166-171 (1986) (discussing the accept-
able range of responses to threatened client perjury for a lawyer under the Sixth Amendment).
44See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.13(b), (d) (1998); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1013-16 (1997)
(discussing Model Rule 1.13). Cf. FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 748-49 (9th
Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (holding that California Law requires a
lawyer to act competently to avoid public harm when the lawyer is aware that the client is dis-
honest).
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also criminal responsibility.45  Concerning the much-discussed di-
lemma of client perjury, the Comment to Rule 3.3(a) states that a
lawyer is to admonish the client about the duty to be truthful in giving
testimony.46 Discharge of that duty rarely can implicate a lawyer in
legal difficulty, but such an eventuality is not impossible.47
These are limited instructions to lawyers concerning their discus-
sions with clients. On the other side, concerning what a lawyer may
say to a client, Rule 2.1 authorizes a lawyer to go beyond "strictly
legal" considerations in advising a client. That rule provides: "In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but also to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation.,
48
Rule 2.1 is merely permissive or "empowering." It simply means
that a lawyer is not being officious in going beyond "strictly legal"
advice, not that a lawyer is obliged to reach in that direction. Nor, in
my opinion, should a rule of professional conduct go further and re-
quire that lawyers become ethical counselors or, in the disparaging
phrase, "social workers." In my opinion, any such requirement would
have little positive effect and could well be counterproductive. The
point is not that a lawyer should disregard such "non-legal" consid-
erations, let alone disparage their significance. Rather, the point is
that the objective of broadening the scope of a lawyer's conversation
with a client, like many objectives in life, cannot be well fulfilled by
mandatory regulation.
IV. How TO TALK WITH A CLIENT?
In professional lore the problem of discussions with clients is
terra incognita-very important terrain about which little is known.
For obvious reasons, there are few systematic studies of the confiden-
tial discourse between clients and lawyers. The study by Austin Sarat
and William Felstiner is the most recent and most penetrating, but
even that study was limited to a specific locale and type of subject
45 See R=ATEMENT (THiRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 3, §77
(discussing liability under general law) (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997).
46 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 3.3 cmt. 5 ("[Tlhe lawyer should
seek to persuade the client that the [false] evidence should not be offered or, if it has been of-
fered, that its false character should immediately be disclosed."); see also RESTATENMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs, supra note 3, § 180 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997)
(providing limitations on a lawyer's behavior when confronted with evidence that is false and
evidence that is believed by the lawyer to be false).
47 See Subway Restaurants, Inc. v. Kessler, 970 P.2d 526 (Kan. 1998) (upholding sanc-
tions against attorney who presented in court a falsified federal income tax return filed by his
client), cert. denied, 119 S. CL 1756 (1999). Cf. John Doe v. The Federal Grievance Comm.,
847 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1988) (evaluating the case of an attorney charged with violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility on the basis that the attorney suspected a witness lied at deposi-
tion but did not so inform the court).
43 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 (1998).
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matter---divorce litigation.49 Many years ago there was a study of
small firm practitioners in Wisconsin.50 Beyond this, as far as I am
aware, there are no studies that would pass muster as reliable on a
similar quantitative basis.
There is of course some anecdotal evidence. It can be fairly said
that the difference between a law student and an experienced lawyer
consists of information that can be encapsulated in anecdotes-the
exposures as a lawyer to the complexities and subtleties of real world
practice, not the least of which are the problems in dealing with cli-
ents. As one of my law students recently observed:
The experiences of lawyers who have been practicing for
some time are beneficial to those that may face similar situa-
tions in the future. Young lawyers ... can develop a sense
of how to deal with a situation and communicate with a client
in a way that is ethical and maintains the professionalism ex-
pected of a lawyer.
There is much that could be learned from careful attention to an-
ecdotes, but that kind of investigation has also been unusual. The
studies along this line by Kenneth Mann of lawyers who defend
white-collar crime, by Jerome Carlin of small firm practitioners, by
Joel Handler of lawyers in middle sized cities, and a few similar un-
dertakings are exemplary in effort but not comprehensive.5' Even
among these, the studies by Kenneth Mann and the work by Austin
Sarat and William Felstiner are unique in their focus on the inter-
changes between client and lawyer as distinct from the lawyer's gen-
eral orientation to practice. As another student observed:
The context of the situation, the sophistication of the cli-
ent, the duration of the lawyer-client relationship, and the
lawyer's personality influences a lawyer's communication
with a client .... For example, if the client is a juvenile
with little education, the lawyer should structure his or her
discussions using elementary terms to explain the legal
process. On the other hand, if a client is general counsel for
49 See AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR
CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING INTHE LEGAL PROCESS (1995).
5o See Lloyd K. Garrison, A Survey ofthe Wisconsin Bar, 10 WIS. L. REV. 131 (1935).
5l See generally MANN, supra note 29; see also E. JEROME CARLN, LAWYERS ON THEIR
OWN: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTIONERS IN CHICAGO (1962); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE
LAWYER AND HIS COMMUNrrY: THE PRACTICING BAR IN A MIDDLE-SIZED CrrY (1967);
HERBERT KRrIZER, LAWYERS WHO LITIGATE: BACKGROUND, WORK SETrING AND ATITrUDES
(1988) (studying lawyers who handle "ordinary litigation"); KEVIN T. McGuIRE, THE SUPREME
COURT BAR: LEGAL ELTES IN THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY (1993) (studying the elite circle
of Washington D.C. lawyers who are in constant demand by parties seeking to access the Su-
preme Court).
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a major corporation, the lawyer may choose to use legal ter-
minology and may focus on the legal conclusion. As a result,
a [single] model for adequate client communications is not
feasible ....
It seems no accident that the systematic studies have addressed
lawyers in solo or small firm practice, as distinct from lawyers in elite
or corporate practice.52 I expect that it will be impossible to get can-
did discussions of the issues from many lawyers in the latter category.
Without going into the sociology of law, the point is simply that law-
yers in elite practice have fewer psychological and professional needs
to explain the problems in their practice, and stronger incentives, in
terms of peer pressure and client sensitivity, not to do so. This esti-
mate is supported by the experience of the researcher who has done
the one study of business ethics that I have found truly illuminating.
The author of that study, Professor Jackall of Williams College, found
that he could engage candid discussion of similar problems inside
corporate management only if the discussion was characterized as
dealing with something other than "ethics. 53  Some materials for
teaching ethics in law school now address these and other delicate
matters of law practice.54 However, experience with teaching ethics
in Continuing Legal Education indicates that lawyers generally are
allergic to serious discussion of such issues in that setting. There is
fiction, which can be true to life but which often is simplistic and ex-
aggerated.55 There are the real life stories that come out of legal mal-
practice litigation, but these transactions are by definition unusual or
even pathological, and virtually always involve dispute as to the facts.
Hence, we are unlikely to find much reliable evidence about how
lawyers really discuss confidential matters with their clients. In de-
fault of such evidence, we can proceed-although cautiously-with a
normative analysis. That is, if we cannot establish through systematic
inquiry how lawyers in fact talk with their clients, in confidential
communications, we could postulate how they ought to talk with their
clients. But it may be that the variousness of law practice is now such
that even a skeletal model is beyond description.
52 On the stratifications of the bar according to type of practice, see JOHN P. HEINZ &
EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SoCIAL STRuCTURE OF THE BAR (1982).
5 See ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS
(1988); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics and Politics in the Corporate World, 6 YALE J.
REG. 155 (1989) (providing a detailed account of the author's views on Jackall's book).
54 I refer specifically to the "video vignettes" produced in recent years, for example those
produced by the University of Pennsylvania Law School and New York University, e.g.,
"Matt's Case" and "Albinex" by Pennsylvania and "Dinner at Sharswood Cafe' by N.Y.U.
55 For example, John Grisham's enormously successful novels. A classic is Anatomy of a
Murder. See ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OFA MURDER (1958).
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V. A MODEL FOR CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS?
A beginning place for a model is to recognize the great differ-
ences among clients in their orientation, incentives, and receptivity
with regard to information and counseling. These variables are con-
ventionally summarized in the term "sophistication" of the client.
Thus, there are great differences, for example, between an experi-
enced business executive and a first-time home buyer, between a first-
time juvenile offender and a criminal accused who has been through
the criminal justice system before, and between a typical blue-collar
industrial worker and a typical industrial engineer. Considering a
different set of characteristics, there are great differences between a
person accused of a felony and one inquiring about the patentability
of a new idea. The range of citizen types who avail themselves of
lawyers' services in this country is probably wider than in any other
community. At the same time, our political ethos, with its emphasis
on equality, makes it awkward or impossible to address differences
among our population in legal terms. Hence, we can refer to this
factor only in the vague concept of "sophistication" and even then
have difficulty in saying anything meaningful about its significance.
56
Correlatively, we must recognize that there are great differences
among lawyers and law firms. Every lawyer has a self-conception
that he projects more or less consciously.57 We would not confuse a
typical bond lawyer or probate counsel with a member of the plain-
tiff's personal injury bar, for example, or even a typical plaintiff's
lawyer and a typical member of the insurance defense bar. The pro-
fessional persona projected in this way provides signals about the
psychological framework of discussions with clients, as well as with
opposing counsel, other parties, and with the courts.
Within these parameters, the most important variable is the sub-
ject matter of the representation. Representation of a litigant presents
problems different from those in transaction matters because, once
locked in litigation, a party has limited freedom. Litigation is coer-
cive on both sides and one cannot disengage in the same way as in a
typical transaction matter. Representation of a criminal accused pres-
ents these problems in the most extreme form. Just as it is difficult to
hold a criminal accused to the same standard of truthfulness as a party
to civil litigation, it is difficult to expect the same level of candor in
the interchange between client and lawyer.
58
56 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 3, § 31
cmt. B (addressing the "sophistication" of clients in connection with disclosure and consulta-
tion).
57 The process of self-projection is beautifully captured in the title of the book by Erving
Goffnan, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
58 Experienced criminal defense counsel do not expect their clients to "level" with them.
One lawyer expressed the point by observing that he never asks a client what the facts "were,"
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Another important variable is the duration and scope of the rela-
tionship between the client and the lawyer. A classic long-term rela-
tionship is not the same as a one-time engagement. Long-term rela-
tionships between a client and a lawyer make possible more searching
communication, perhaps with fewer words, than what might be called
"one day stands." As we have become well aware, long-term client-
lawyer relationships are less often encountered these days. Indeed,
the most common long-term relationship these days is likely to be
between inside counsel and corporate management. That circum-
stance puts into different light the conception of independence in
practice of law. These days, a lawyer in independent practice may
have greater formal independence but simply be a stranger to the cli-
ent.
Other variables can be brought to mind: The age and experience
of the lawyer, the relative age of the client, the size and relative inti-
macy of the community in which they live, the region of the country
(New York and Los Angeles are different), and others.
We must also remember that communications with the client
serve functions beyond conveying information. These communica-
tions must not only be technically accurate but understandable to a lay
person. They must be objective but also compassionate, coldly real-
istic but warmly humane. As indicated in the study by Professors
Sarat and Felstiner, they must also express a complex balance be-
tween encouragement to the client, in the face of legal uncertainty and
resistance from the other side, and "cooling out" unrealistic hopes.59
At the same time, they must also serve to maintain the client's confi-
dence but not convey a sense that the lawyer can perform magic.
VI. CONCLUSION
If this analysis is correct, we cannot make accurate generalized
descriptions of the confidential communications between clients and
lawyers. Nor can we prescribe a model for such communications ex-
cept in the broadest terms, indeed nearly vacuous ones. This conclu-
sion suggests that academic discussions of proper communication
between lawyer and client have limited foundation and usefulness. It
probably also explains why it is difficult to address the subject in such
settings as law school and Continuing Legal Education. This is be-
cause the manner of these communications is a matter personal to
each lawyer and dependent on each lawyer's moral predisposition and
personal concept of professionalism. Realization of these limiting
but instead asks what the police will say the facts are. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., Er AL.,
THE LAW AND ETHics OF LAwYERING 375 & n.39 (2d ed. 1994). The truth usually would inter-
fere with the relationship between client and defense counsel.
59 See SARAT & FEaSTiNER, supra note 49, at 56-57.
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considerations is chastening from a viewpoint of social control and
regulation. We must accept that adequate and suitable communica-
tion with clients is largely beyond regulation in the mode of a con-
sumer's protection law or securities laws disclosure requirements. It
therefore turns out to be a matter of personal and professional morals
and ethics.
